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ABSTRACT 
 
Asymmetric Labor-Supply Responses to Wage-Rate Changes: 
Evidence from a Field Experiment* 
 
The standard labor-supply literature typically assumes that the labor supply response to 
wage increases is the same as that for equivalent wage decreases. However, evidence from 
the behavioral-economics literature suggests that people are loss averse and thus perceive 
losses differently than gains. This behavioral insight may imply that workers respond 
differently to wage increases than to wage decreases. We estimate the effect of wage 
increases and decreases on labor supply using a randomized field experiment with workers 
on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. The results provide evidence that wage increases have 
smaller effects than wage decreases, suggesting that the labor-supply response to wage 
changes is asymmetric. This finding is especially strong on the extensive margin where the 
elasticity for a wage decrease is twice that for a wage increase. These findings suggest that a 
reference-dependent utility function that incorporates loss aversion is the most appropriate 
way to model labor supply. 
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1 Introduction
Motivation and Research Question. The standard labor supply literature typically
makes the implicit assumption that the labor supply response to wage increases is the
same as that for equivalent wage decreases. In other words, wage increases and wage
decreases of equal magnitude have the same effect (though with opposite signs) on labor
supply decisions. This assumption implies that labor-supply elasticities with respect to
wages do not depend on the sign of the wage variation. However, an extensive literature
building on Kahneman and Tversky (1979) has established that individuals are loss averse
and thus perceive negative changes (changes in the loss domain) differently than positive
changes (changes in the gain domain). This behavioral insight suggests that workers
respond differently to wage increases than to wage decreases, and thus casts doubts on
the accuracy of labor supply elasticity estimates that do not account for the sign of the
wage variation.
Although there are a few studies that incorporate loss aversion into empirical
strategies aimed at identifying labor supply elasticities (related literature discussed below),
there still remains a large gap in the literature regarding the symmetricity of the wage
elasticity of labor supply. This paper contributes to filling this gap in the literature. Our
precise research question is: do wage increases and decreases of equal magnitude have
symmetric effects on labor supply? Answering this research question requires a set-up
where reforms introduce (quasi-) randomly assigned wage increases and decreases at the
same time for comparable individuals. Finding such types of reforms in ‘natural’ settings
is difficult, if not impossible, and thus may partly explain the sparse literature on the
symmetricity of labor supply responses to wages.
The Field Experiment. We address these empirical challenges using a field
experiment on labor supply where we randomly assign wage increases and decreases of
equal magnitude to workers. Specifically, we set-up a real labor task and invite workers to
work on this task in an actual online-labor-market, namely Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
(henceforth mTurk). The labor task is advertised on the mTurk website as any other
labor task and workers receive wages that are comparable to other wages on mTurk. In
addition, the labor task is designed to be perceived as realistic as possible; it requires
workers to transcribe scanned German-language documents. Importantly, the workers in
our experiment do not know that they are participating in an academic experiment.
The experiment is designed to induce an exogenously determined reference wage
using two strategies. First, we announce a certain wage per transcribed picture in the
advertisement of our task on the mTurk website. Second, workers complete one batch of
transcriptions for the wage announced in the mTurk advertisement. After transcribing
the first batch of images, all workers are randomly assigned to one of three groups: 1)
the wage remains constant (control group), 2) the wage increases by 20%, 3) the wage
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decreases by 20%. After the updated wages have been presented to workers, they can
select to either stop working on our labor task or keep working as much as they wish.
We identify the symmetricity of the labor supply response by comparing labor supply
behavior between the three randomly assigned groups.
Findings. The results show that the labor-supply response to wage changes is
asymmetric. This asymmetry is especially strong on the extensive margin defined as
the share of workers who quit conditional on seeing the treatment information. The
estimated extensive-margin treatment effect for workers who experience a wage decrease
is approximately twice that of workers who experienced a wage increase. Estimates of the
intensive margin response are also suggestive of an asymmetric response; differences are
large, but imprecisely estimated. Though we cannot reject the null that the number of
transcriptions responded symmetrically to the wage change, we find that the share of the
transcription response that can be explained by the extensive margin differs significantly
between the wage increase and decease groups. Finally, the results show that the wage
changes did not have any effect on the quality of transcriptions, which is above 96 percent
in all groups. Overall, our results point to an upward sloping supply curve that appears
to be kinked around the reference wage of $0.15.
Our findings can be rationalized by the theoretical model put forward by Ahrens
et al. (2014). They incorporate loss aversion in a model of labor supply and show that the
labor supply curve is kinked at a reference wage. Drawing on the loss aversion literature,
they further show that the supply curve is flatter in the loss domain than in the gain
domain. This implies that wage decreases have stronger labor-supply effects than wage
increases; i.e., the labor supply response to wage changes is asymmetric even for marginal
changes in wage. This is precisely what we find.
Contribution to the Literature. Our paper speaks and contributes to three
strands of literature. First, we add to the literature on labor-supply effects of wage
changes. Economists have explored the effect of wages on labor supply for several decades
(see Keane, 2011, for a survey). Many of these studies use panel-data sets and exploit
positive and negative variation in wages to estimate the wage elasticity of labor supply.1
Because the elasticity estimated by these studies represents roughly an average of wage-
increase-induced and wage-decrease-induced elasticities, our paper suggests that existing
estimates likely overestimate the effect of wage increases while underestimating the effect
1It is sometimes argued that nominal wage cuts are rare and therefore not relevant. While we
acknowledge that nominal wage cuts occur less often than increases, it has been shown that wage cuts do
happen; for example during recessions and bankruptcies, and for the self-employed and salary earners
(Kahn, 1997). In addition, many studies on labor-supply elasticities use upward and downward variation
in tax rates to instrument for wages (e.g., Eissa and Liebman, 1996; Rothstein, 2010). This generates
downward variation in wages even in the absence of nominal wage cuts. Our study is also relevant for
decreases in real wages, which occur more frequently than nominal wage cuts. Our results may suggest
that inflation-induced decreases of real wages have larger labor supply effects than previously thought.
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of wage decreases.
Relatedly, our results further raise questions about the comparability of labor-supply
elasticities across studies that differ in the sign of the wage changes used for identification.
Our findings suggest that it cannot be concluded from the estimated elasticities that
workers are more responsive in the one setting relative to another without knowing
whether the sign of the wage changes is the same. This is especially important for
meta-analysis studies on labor supply (e.g., Evers et al., 2008). Our findings imply that
in such meta-analyses one should include an indicator variable to distinguish between
labor supply estimates based on wage increases from those based on wage decreases. Our
finding that the largest asymmetry is along the extensive margin is especially important
for understanding the labor-supply effects of wages since it is generally accepted that
labor-supply elasticities are mainly determined by the extensive margin response (Blundell
and MaCurdy, 1999; Meghir and Phillips, 2010; Bargain et al., 2014).
The study most closely related to ours is Kube et al. (2013), who conduct a field
experiment with students working in a library for a given period of time. They generate
an exogenous reference wage by announcing a projected hourly wage to all workers when
the job is advertised. Immediately before the task starts, they announce a higher wage to
workers in one treatment group and a lower wage to workers in another group. Workers in
the control condition receive the initially announced wage. The study finds that the wage
cut decreases work effort (i.e., output generated during the given period of time) whereas
the wage increase does not have any effect relative to the control group. In line with our
findings on transcription accuracy, their study also does not find any effects on quality
of work. While these results are broadly consistent with our findings, our paper differs
from theirs in the design of the labor market institution; this has important implications
for the interpretation and application of our findings. The institutions differ in that we
pay workers for each transcribed picture instead of for a predetermined number of hours,
and we allow workers to quit the labor task whenever the choose to do so. Furthermore,
our analysis is based on a much larger sample of workers from a real-world labor market.
Therefore, our design is representative of labor markets where workers receive piece-rate
payment and have tremendous labor supply flexibility whereas Kube et al. (2013) focuses
on labor markets where workers are required to work a predetermined number of hours
for a fixed hourly wage rate. One advantage of our design is that workers are able to
respond on two additional margins that are not included in Kube et al. (2013); extensive
margin and the intensive-time margin. As a result, we are able to study asymmetric
responses to wage changes on the extensive and intensive margins. Additionally, because
our workers receive a piece rate, subjects who reduce output earn a lower pay-off and
have less scope to punish their employer through shirking. This reduces the likelihood
that our findings are driven by reciprocity as in Kube et al. (2013). Therefore, we are
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able to show that labor supply asymmetry exists even in the absence of a reciprocity
motive. The institutional frame-work of our study – large sample of workers in their
natural labor-market environment – also implies that our findings can be generalized to
similarly situated labor markets; large crowd-sourcing labor markets characterized by low
wage and high flexibility.
Our paper further relates to several studies showing that individual labor supply
decisions are affected by target incomes. In a survey of the literature, Goette et al.
(2004) show how empirical results on labor-supply behavior are consistent with reference-
dependent preferences where workers provide high effort if they are below a target income,
whereas they provide less effort if they have surpassed a target. These types of preferences
are, for example, found for taxi drivers (Camerer et al., 1997; Crawford and Meng, 2011)
or bicycle messengers (Fehr and Goette, 2007). Empirical evidence also suggests that loss
aversion affects job searches (DellaVigna et al., 2015). While these studies demonstrate
that workers have target incomes and loss-aversion preferences in the context of labor
supply, they do not allow conclusions about the asymmetric effects of wages.
Second, our paper makes a direct contribution to the behavioral-economics literature
on loss aversion following Kahneman and Tversky (1979). This literature pursues the idea
that individuals evaluate outcomes relative to reference points. These types of preferences
are commonly termed reference-dependent preferences and have been formalized by Koszegi
and Rabin (2006, 2007, 2009). Loss aversion, “the most notable manifestation of such
reference-dependent preferences” (Koszegi and Rabin, 2006, page 1133), describes the
notion that individuals weight negative deviations (losses) from the reference point more
than gains of equal magnitude. In models of reference-dependent preferences, the reference
point is usually assumed to be determined by the individual’s expectations. There is a
large empirical literature showing that individuals indeed have preferences consistent with
loss aversion and that individual expectations determine the reference point (e.g., Dunn,
1996; Post et al., 2008; Abeler et al., 2011; Card and Dahl, 2011; Marzilli Ericson and
Fuster, 2011; Pope and Schweitzer, 2011). We add to this literature in that we provide
additional empirical evidence that individuals have preferences that are consistent with
loss aversion and reference dependence in the context of labor supply.
Finally, our paper raises important questions about the elasticity of taxable income
which plays a crucial role in our understanding of the efficiency costs of taxation (e.g.,
Saez et al., 2012; Kleven and Schultz, 2014). In particular, our results suggest that failure
to distinguish between ETI estimated with tax rate increases and ETI estimated with
tax rate decreases is likely to lead to an underestimation of the efficiency cost of tax rate
increases. This problem is likely to be even more important than with wage changes since
tax rates generally move freely in both directions. Of course, the labor supply response to
wage changes is not necessarily identical to the response to tax rate changes. Therefore,
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we are cautious in generalizing our results to the case of tax rate changes.
Structure of the Paper. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the real labor task and its implementation in Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. In Section 3 we
lay out the theoretical approach following Ahrens et al. (2014), which incorporates loss
aversion. Section 4 describes the data and our empirical approach. We present the results
in Section 5 and discuss potential mechanisms in Section 6, before Section 7 concludes.
2 The Experiment
This section describes the field experiment used to estimate the impact of wage rate
changes on labor supply. We begin by describing the labor task, the treatment design and
the implementation in Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.
2.1 Design
Labor Task. We selected an online labor task that requires subjects to transcribe
German text shown in a series of images. The German texts are taken from a recent
publication, but each page of the document is deliberately ruﬄed so that the scanned
versions appear much older than they really are. The advantage of changing the appearance
of the images is the subjects are more likely to believe that the texts were scanned from
old books for which a digital copy is not available. The task then, is to digitize these “old”
German books. Each image has approximately five lines and 43 words (344 characters).
Figure 1 shows an example. Subjects are randomly shown one of 128 images at a time
and are instructed to hit “save picture” when they are done transcribing the text in the
image. A new image is shown after the subject hits “save picture”.
Treatment Groups. We use a between-subjects design in order to identify the effect
of wage changes on labor supply. Subjects are randomly assigned to one of three groups:
one control group and two treatment groups. Subjects in all three groups work on the
labor task described above and are paid a piece rate for each image that is transcribed.
The piece rate (called bonus in the experiment) is set at $0.15 for each of the first six
transcribed images in all three groups. Subjects receive a notification thanking them for
transcribing the images after the first six images have been transcribed. They are then
told that they can transcribe additional images and that the piece rate for the additional
images is either $0.18, $0.15 or $0.12, for the wage-increase, control, and wage-decrease
groups, respectively (see Figure 4 for an explanatory treatment notification). Notice that
the wage rate remains fixed at $0.15 for the control group, and that the wage rate change
is the same for both treatment groups; in each case the rate changes by $0.03 or 20%.
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Reference Point. The experiment is designed to exogenously establish a clear and
salient reference wage. The literature typically finds that reference points depend on
rational, individual expectations, suggesting that expectations about the per-unit wage
form the reference point in the context of labor supply decisions in our experiment (e.g.,
Koszegi and Rabin, 2006; Abeler et al., 2011; Ahrens et al., 2014). Therefore, potential
workers are told that the wage per transcribed picture is $0.15 in the job announcement.
In addition, workers who start working on our task face the announced wage of $0.15 for
the first six transcribed pictures, after which the wage rate either increases or decreases.
We argue that this design generates the expectation that the per-unit wage will remain
constant at $0.15 throughout the entire task. In other words, we argue that $0.15
constitutes the reference point in our experimental set-up.
One potential drawback of our experimental design is that it may raise concerns
of deception since the job description does not notify subjects of the possibility that
the wage may increase or decrease after a certain number of transcribed pictures. This
was a deliberate choice in an effort to establish a clear and salient reference point.2 We
minimize these deception concerns by including the following pieces of information in
the treatment notification (see Figure 4). First, we thank the workers for completing the
transcription task and remind them that, as promised in the introduction of the task,
they will be paid $0.15 for each of the pictures they transcribed so far. Next, we inform
them that they have the option to transcribe additional images and that the piece rate for
these additional transcriptions is different from that for the first batch of transcriptions.
Finally, we make it clear that they can stop and exit the task at this point if they wish
and instruct them on what to do next to ensure we are able to process their payment.3
We argue that these design features make it clear to workers that they first transcribe
pictures based on the piece rate announced in the introduction to the task, and that they
can transcribe additional pictures at a new rate.
2.2 Implementation
Labor Market and Recruitment. The experiment is implemented in the field using
workers on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. mTurk is an online labor market where job offers
are posted and workers choose jobs for payment. It has numerous benefits for running
2If we had informed subjects about the possibility of a wage change, we would have generated
uncertainty about the eventual wage and the reference wage would not have been as clear.
3The notification reads: “Thank you for transcribing these pictures. As written in the introduction,
we will grant a bonus of $0.15 for each of these pictures. There are additional pictures that you can
transcribe. However, the bonus payment for each additional picture will be $0.12/$0.18 from now on.
You will receive $0.15 bonus for each of the six pictures you transcribed so far, though. If you want to
stop and exit, just copy your Personal ID to the Amazon Turk Website and submit the HIT.” Instead of
the wage change, we include the following message for the control group: “There are additional pictures
that you can transcribe. Just as before, the bonus for each additional picture will be $0.15.”
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experiments, including access to a large stable subject pool, diverse subject background,
and low cost.4 Furthermore, the behavior of online workers has been shown to be
comparable to those of subjects in laboratory studies (Horton et al., 2011). In addition,
experimenter effects are avoided because subjects do not know that they participate in an
experiment (Paolacci et al., 2010; Horton et al., 2011; Buhrmester et al., 2011; Mason
and Suri, 2011). Importantly for us, we are able to identify the effect of wages changes in
a naturally occurring labor market. In general, experiments on Amazon Turk therefore
combine internal and external validity since it is a real labor market with actual workers
where randomized trials can be conducted (Horton et al., 2011).5
Although we recruit workers through mTurk, they complete the labor task on an
external website that we created for the purposes of the experiment. We first create a
human intelligence task (HIT) that is advertised on mTurk. The HIT includes a description
of the labor task and compensation. It also includes instructions for how to complete
the task; see Figure 2. Particularly, subjects are told to accept the HIT and click on the
weblink if they are interested in completing the task. Subjects who click on the link are
taken to our external website where they are randomly assigned to one of three groups
and shown the instructions in Figure 3. Subjects are instructed to click continue if they
wish to work on the task, and those who do are shown images of scanned German text
that they must transcribe for payment. Each page of our website shows the subjects
their personal ID, number of pictures transcribed so far, and the current piece rate. We
implement treatment after six images have been transcribed and limit the total number
of images that each subject can transcribe to 50. However, subjects are not aware of
either of these limits until they reach them. In other words, subjects do not know that
the HIT has six images, that they will have the opportunity to continue working after the
first six images, that the piece rate might be different if they continue working, or that
they can only transcribe up to 50 images if they chose to continue working. Subjects in
wage-decrease group who complete six transcriptions are shown the treatment information
illustrated in Figure 4. A similar text is shown to subjects in the wage-increase group and
the control group; the only difference is the piece rate for the additional images.
Transcribing text from an image can be a tedious task. However, given that the text
in the images is short, the task could be perceived as mostly costless for German speakers.
In order to reduce this possibility and ensure that the labor costs are non-zero, we restrict
the subject pool to workers with a US IP address. The idea here is that the labor cost of
transcribing German text is much higher for non-Germans than for Germans. Of course,
our restriction does not preclude the possibility that German speakers participated in the
task. However, any Germans who participated in our experiment are randomly distributed
4According to Amazon, there are over 500,000 workers from 190 countries in the mTurk labor market:
https://requester.mturk.com/tour.
5Kuziemko et al. (2015) is a recent example of an economics paper using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.
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across our treatments and therefore have no effect on our outcome of interest.
The experiment is programmed on mTurk to expire after 750 workers accept the
HIT or 10 days have passed, which ever comes first. Our initial run of the experiment,
which started on June 15, 2015, expired after 10 days with only 418 workers. Therefore,
we initiated a second run on July 20, 2015, and this run expired after hitting the 750
worker threshold six days later. In total, 1,168 workers participated in the two runs.
Note that the HIT is designed such that workers cannot work on the task more than
once. We also excluded workers who participated in the first run from participating in the
second run. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that individuals have multiple worker accounts
to avoid these constraint: First, when registering for mTurk, Amazon requires workers
to confirm in the Participation Agreement that they “may not use multiple Amazon
Accounts to register with Mechanical Turk”. Second, the Participation Agreement further
requires workers to provide “true and accurate” information on a worker’s name, email
address, phone number and physical address.6 Third, workers are required to provide
a tax identification number (Social Security Number or Individual Tax Identification
Number) after their mTurk lifetime earnings have exceeded a set threshold. Workers who
fail to provide this number are not allowed to accept additional HITs on mTurk.
Payment. The experiment ends for each subject when she decides to stop or when she
transcribes 50 pictures, whichever comes first. In either case, each subject is instructed to
copy her personal ID number, which is shown in the top right corner of each page, and
paste it in the entry box on the mTurk website. This process is necessary for us to match
subjects to their mTurk worker ID and thus process their payments. Subjects receive a
participation reward of $0.10, which is paid as long as a subject accepts the HIT and
completes at least one transcription. Additionally, subjects are paid a piece rate of $0.15
for each of the first six transcribed pictures, and depending on treatment group, $0.12,
$0.15 or $0.18 for each transcribed image above the first six transcriptions. Given the
payment restrictions imposed by the mTurk platform, we frame the piece rate as a bonus
in all communications to the subjects. For example, subjects in the control group are
told they will be paid $0.10 for participating in our HIT and a bonus of $0.15 for each
transcribed picture.
3 Theoretical Framework
This section presents a theoretical framework that allows us to predict the impact of
wage increases and decreases on labor-supply. The framework is informed by Ahrens et al.
(2014) who incorporate loss aversion into a standard labor-supply model.
6The Participation Agreement is online at: https://www.mturk.com/mturk/conditionsofuse.
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The Model. Ahrens et al. (2014) develop a model where workers with reference-
dependent preferences maximize the following utility function:
U(C,L) = UC(C)− θiL
ϑi
ϑi
,
where C is consumption, L is labor supply (hours worked or effort), and θi is a parameter
to ensure preference continuity at the reference wage. UC(C) is utility from consumption
and the term L
ϑi
ϑi
indicates disutility from working. ϑi is a measure of loss aversion, which
is characterized by the following piece-wise function:
ϑi =
ϑ1 if w > wrϑ2 if w < wr.
In this equation, w is the current wage (per unit of L supplied) and wr is the
reference wage. If w is above the reference wage, the worker is in the so-called gain
domain, and if w is below the reference wage, she is in the loss domain. A subject is loss
averse if ϑ1 > ϑ2, implying that the marginal utility loss from working is higher in the
gain domain than in the loss domain. This means that workers are less willing to supply
an additional unit of labor when the wage is above the reference wage than when it is
below. Maximizing with respect to the budget constraint C = wL gives the following
kinked labor-supply curve:7
L =
( wθ1 )
1
ϑ1−1 if w > wr
( w
θ2
)
1
ϑ2−1 if w < wr
The Prediction. Because of loss aversion with respect to the reference wage wr (and
hence ϑ1 > ϑ2), we get that
1
ϑ1−1 <
1
ϑ2−1 . This implies that subjects whose current wage
is the reference wage wr are more responsive to wage decreases than to wage increases.8
The main insight from this theoretical framework is sketched in Figure 5, which
relates leisure and wages. A worker who is located at the reference wage, denoted R, will
respond differently to wage increases and decreases of equal magnitude. In particular, a
worker at the reference point weights wage decreases more heavily than wage increases.
As a result, she will respond more strongly to a wage decrease (by working less) than an
equally sized wage increase (to which she will respond through more labor supply). This
result implies that labor supply elasticities identified from wage increases are predicted
7We only discuss the main implications of the model here since Ahrens et al. (2014) has all of the
derivations.
8As before, we assume an upward sloping labor supply curve where the substitution effect dominates
the income effect. That is, subjects work more when wages go up and they work less when wages fall.
This assumption is also supported by our empirical findings.
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to be smaller than labor supply elasticities identified from wage decreases. Our field
experiment tests this prediction; the results are presented in the next sections.
The Reference Wage. The natural question at this point is regarding the determi-
nation of the reference wage wr. As discussed before, the literature typically finds that
reference points depend on expectations (e.g., Koszegi and Rabin, 2006; Abeler et al.,
2011; Ahrens et al., 2014). Our experiment is designed such that $0.15 constitutes the
reference wage wr (see section 2.1). As a result, in our experiment the labor supply curve
derived above is kinked at the wage level of $0.15.
4 Data and empirical approach
This section describes our outcome variables, details on the sample, and the empirical
strategy used to identify the symmetry of wage effects.
4.1 Outcome Variables
We construct several outcome variables that measure different aspects of labor supply in
order to identify the effect of wage changes on labor supply. These include the quit rate,
number of transcribed pictures, time spent transcribing, transcription rate, and accuracy.
Each of these variables is described in greater detail below.
Transcriptions and Hours. Because workers are paid for each transcribed image, we
expect that they will respond to the wage changes by changing the number of images they
transcribe. Therefore, one variable of interest is the total number of transcribed images
per worker. We further explore the the total time spent working on the task and the time
per transcribed text (transcription rate). Because we do not have an exact measure of
the time workers actually spent working on a picture, we proxy the transcription rate by
counting the time between the submission of two transcriptions. We acknowledge that
this likely overstates the transcription time for any given image. However, the difference
in transcription rate between groups should still be instructive of the impact of wage
changes.
Extensive Margin. Recall that workers are notified of treatment after transcribing six
images. The notification makes it clear that the worker has completed the HIT, but that
there are additional (optional) images to transcribe. Workers are also informed that they
can quit the task at this point or continue transcribing the additional images at the newly
announced wage rate. Given these features of the treatment notification, we interpret the
decision to stop working at this point as an extensive margin decision. Therefore, one of
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our key outcome variables is the share of workers who quit the task immediately after
receiving the notification. Because the treatment notification has a modest nudge to quit,
we expect that the share of quitters will be reasonably high in the control group despite
the fact that the wage remains constant. The important question for us is: does the wage
increase/decrease have any effect beyond this modest nudge.
An important feature of online-labor markets such as mTurk is that they facilitate
almost instantaneous switching of labor tasks. In other words, a worker can quit one
job this second and start a new job the next second. This is not unlike what one would
observe in traditional labor markets where a worker secures a new job before quitting her
existing job. Unfortunately, we do not observe what subjects do when they quit our task.
Therefore, the extensive margin response in our study simply means that the worker quits
our task. We cannot say whether or not they quit working online or switch to a more
profitable task. The most reasonable assumption, though, is that they simply switch to
another task.
Accuracy. Recall that the transcriptions are based on text for which we have the
original digital copy. This makes it possible for us to measure accuracy by comparing the
transcribed text for each worker to the actual text.
4.2 Sample
Our HIT was accepted by 1,168 mTurk workers. We restrict the sample to those workers
who completed at least one picture, and therefore received the participation fee; this leaves
us with 1,158 workers. We observe in the data that a few workers worked on the task for
an unreasonable number of time, e.g., several days. To avoid this source of noise, we drop
the top 0.05% of workers in the distribution of minutes worked; these are six workers who
worked for more than 385 minutes on the task. Table 1 presents summary statistics for our
sample of workers (N = 1, 152) with regard to our main variables: number of transcribed
pictures, accuracy of transcription, and total time worked. We observe that, on average,
workers transcribed 12.8 pictures9 over an average time span of 39.79 minutes. The
transcription quality was very high with an average accuracy of 96.97%. This is reassuring
as it suggests that workers take the task seriously and provided high-quality transcriptions.
Note that we intended to avoid giving the impression that subjects are participating in
an experiment, and therefore did not survey any demographic characteristics.
Because the treatment variation in wages only appears after the first batch of six
transcriptions, only a share of the total 1,152 participants are exposed to the treatment
condition. Table 2 shows that 62.5% (720) of the 1,152 workers completed at least six
9Figure 14 in the Appendix provides the distribution of completed pictures for all workers in the
sample.
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pictures and therefore saw the treatment notification. This share ranges from 59% in
the wage-increase group to 65% in the wage-decrease group. The number of observations
in each treatment group is summarized in Table 2. In total, we have 248, 215, and 257
workers who saw the treatment notification in the control, increase and decrease groups,
respectively. Because workers did not know they were in an experiment or that the
wage rate would change, self-selection into the treatments was impossible. We therefore
argue that the groups are balanced with respect to the characteristics that predict the
probability of quitting before seeing the treatment, and thus we restrict the empirical
analysis that follows to the sample of 720 participants who saw the treatment.
A common feature of mTurk is that workers discuss HITs on forums. This can
raise issues for experimenters as those workers who have completed the experiment will
unknowingly share the details of treatments with other workers who have yet to complete
the experiment. We followed the forums on mTurk in order to determine if our HIT was
being discussed and discovered that our HIT did in fact show up on one of the forums.10
The first mention of our HIT occurred on July 24 during the second run of the experiment.
We noticed the mention on the 26th when the HIT had already expired. The discussion
on the forum was favorable towards our HIT, but workers discussed the fact that the
wage rate changed as well as the magnitude of the changes. They also discussed potential
reasons for rate changes, and mostly speculated that the wage variation must be due the
quality of work. Nobody speculated that this task is an experiment; people therefore still
did not know they were part of an experiment.
The forum post led to a significant spike in acceptance of our HIT; approximately
58% of the workers accepted the HIT after the forum discussion began. Because some of
these subjects knew of a potential wage variation before accepting the HIT, self-selection
might be a problem. For example, it is possible that only workers who are willing to work
for our lowest wage rate accepted our HIT. If this is the only source of selection, then
our analysis produces a lower bound estimate in both groups. A more troubling source
of selection is a case where workers sign up with the hope of receiving a wage increase.
These subjects would effectively have a reference wage of $0.18, and would be more likely
to quit the task if assigned to the wage decrease group. This source of selection would
lead to a downward bias in the wage-decrease group and upward bias in the wage-increase
group. Because of this potential problem, we present estimates with and without the
post-forum sample. There is no evidence that the forum had an effect on the results (see
Appendix B).
10See https://www.reddit.com/r/HITsWorthTurkingFor/comments/3eg39l/us_transcribe_
texts_from_an_image_payment_bonus/.
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4.3 Empirical Strategy
Random assignment to treatment groups ensures that our empirical approach is straight
forward. We use non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for differences in distributions
between treatment groups (Wilcoxon, 1945; Mann and Whitney, 1947). In addition, we
run simple OLS regressions of the outcome variables on the treatment dummies. These
empirical analyses allow us to identify the effect of wage changes on our outcome variables
and to determine whether these responses are symmetric or not. To test for symmetry,
we use the coefficients of the OLS regressions and t-tests to test the null that the sum
of the estimated coefficients for the wage-increase group and wage-decrease group (both
relative to the control group) is zero.
The estimated treatment effects are then used to calculate implied elasticities
separately for each treatment group. Using the control group as a counterfactual, we
derive the elasticity of an outcome variable Y with respect to wage for each treatment
group i (either wage increase or decrease) as follows:
i =
(Yi − Yc)/Yc
(wi − wc)/wc , (1)
where subscript c indicates the control group, Y is the group average in the respective
outcome variable, w is the wage per transcribed picture, (wi − wc) is the change in wages
in group i (either +3 or −3), and (Yi − Yc) is the difference between the outcome variable
in group i and the control group. Specifically, (Yi− Yc) is the difference in means between
the relevant treated group and the control group or, equivalently, the regression coefficient
of the respective treatment dummy. Statistical significance of the elasticity is the same as
the statistical significance of the respective treatment dummy in the regressions.
5 Results
We present the empirical results in this section. The mean of each outcome variable, by
treatment group, is presented in Figures 6 to 13, and Table 3 shows the results of OLS
regressions.
5.1 Extensive Margin
Figure 6 displays the treatment effects on the extensive margin, i.e., the share of workers
who quit immediately after having seen the treatment variation. We observe that 14.1%
of all workers in the control group quit the labor task after receiving the treatment
notification. Relative to the control group, the share of quitters is 8.5 percentage points
lower in the wage-increase group and 17.8 percentage points higher in the wage-decrease
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group. These group-wise differences between means are all statistically significant at the
1% level according to non-parametric ranksum tests. These results are also demonstrated
in OLS regressions of the extensive-margin indicator variable on the treatment dummies;
see Model I of Table 3.
An important observation is that the extensive margin response is asymmetric; the
treatment effect for the wage-increase group is economically and statistically different
from that for the wage-decrease group (p-value: 0.094). The asymmetry is also evident in
the implied elasticities (as calculated by equation 1), which is 3.0 in the increase group
and 6.3 in the decrease group.
5.2 Time responses
Time Spent Working. Figure 7 shows that, on average, subjects in the control group
spent about 61 minutes working on the labor task. Relative to the control group, workers
who experienced a wage increase worked on the task for 6 additional minutes while
those who experienced a wage decrease spent 11 fewer minutes working on the task. A
non-parametric test shows that the treatment effect is statistically different from zero for
the wage-decrease group, but not for the wage increase group.
The non-parametric results are also reflected by the regressions; see Model III of
Table 3. The differences indicate an asymmetric effect; the treatment effect is larger in
the wage-decrease group than in the wage-increase group. This is also evident by the
implied elasticities, which are 0.50 in the increase group and 0.87 in the decrease group.
However, we cannot reject the null that the difference between the treatment effects is
zero. In other words, though the relative magnitude of the treatment effects is indicative
of an asymmetric response, we cannot rule out symmetry in a statistical sense.
The effect on the total time spent working described above can be decomposed into
two parts; the first due to the extensive margin response and the second due to the intensive
margin response. We identify the contribution of the intensive margin response in Figure
8, which plots the mean of the total number of minutes worked conditional on not quitting
right away after the treatment. The Figure shows that, conditional on transcribing at least
one picture after the treatment notification, workers in the control group spent an average
of 68 minutes on the task. Relative to the control group, workers in the wage-increase
group worked for one additional minute while workers in the wage-decrease group spent
4 fewer minutes on the task. Subtracting these intensive-time-margin treatment effects
from the total treatment effects implies that the extensive margin response explains the
overwhelming majority of the effect on time spent working on the task. In fact, the
extensive margin response explains 83% (= (6− 1)/6) and 64% (= (11− 4)/11) of the
time margin response in the wage increase and decrease groups, respectively.
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Transcription Rate. The results for the transcription rate are shown in Figure 9.
Workers on average spent 3.8, 3.4 and 3.9 minutes for one picture in the control, increase
and decrease groups, respectively. The differences between groups are not statistically
significant (also see Model IV in Table 3). We further separate this total effect into its
intensive and extensive margin components and find that there is no statistically significant
effect on either margin (see Figure 10 which reports the transcription rate conditional on
completing at least one transcription after the treatment notification).
5.3 Number and quality of transcriptions
Number of Transcribed Pictures. Figure 11 shows that the treatment variation
clearly affected the number of transcribed pictures per worker. While the average worker
transcribed 19.04 images in the control group, the average worker completed 22.35 and
15.25 pictures in the wage-increase and wage-decrease groups, respectively. All group-wise
differences between groups are distinguishable from zero at the 1%-level according to
non-parametric rank-sum tests. These results are confirmed in Model II of Regression
Table 3, which also shows that we cannot reject the null that the wage effect on total
output is symmetric.
As in section 5.2, we decompose the total effect on number of transcribed pictures
into its intensive and extensive margin components. We begin with the contribution of
the intensive margin response by calculating the per-worker number of transcriptions
for each group conditional on completing at least one picture after seeing the treatment
information. These results, which are presented in Figure 12, show that output is higher
when wages rise and lower when wages fall. While the non-parametric tests reveal that the
difference between the control and increase group is statistically significant, the difference
between control and decrease is not significant (p-value: 0.15). More importantly, the
magnitude of these intensive-time-margin effects is not asymmetric in a statistical sense.
We next identify the contribution of the extensive margin response by subtracting
the intensive-time-margin effect from the total effect. For example, the total treatment
effect for the wage-increase group is 3.3 transcriptions. From Figure 12, we know that
2.14 of this effect is due to the intensive-time-margin response. Therefore, the balance
of 1.17 (= 3.31 − 2.14) is due to the extensive margin response. A similar calculation
for the wage-decrease group reveals that the contribution of the extensive margin is 2.19.
The fact that 2.19 is almost twice as large as 1.17 suggests that the contribution of the
extensive margin response is asymmetric.
Quality of transcriptions. Figure 13 depicts that the wage-rate changes did not have
any effects on the quality of transcription. The differences are tiny and indistinguishable
from zero, which confirms that workers in all groups paid careful attention to the task.
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This result is in line with the field experiment of Kube et al. (2013) who do not find any
effects of wages on work quality either.
5.4 Robustness
Because the workers discussed our task on the mTurk forum, it is possible that our findings
are driven by selection into the HIT. We explore this by performing the analyses separately
on the sample of workers who worked on our task before it was discussed online and the
sample of workers who worked on it afterwards. These results, which are presented in
Appendix B, show no evidence that our results are driven by selection among workers
who participated in the post-forum period. In addition, we regress each outcome variable
on a dummy variable indicating whether the subject worked on the task before or after
the forum post; we do not find any significant effects of working on the task after the
forum post (results not reported).
6 Discussion of results
We begin this section by arguing that our findings are due to reference-dependent utility
functions with loss aversion. This is followed by a discission of other possible explanations
for our findings; in each case we argue that the alternatives are less likely than loss-aversion.
We then describe the policy implications and generalizability of our findings.
6.1 Mechanisms
Loss Aversion. Our results show that the extensive margin response to wage changes
is strongly asymmetric. We also find evidence of an asymmetric intensive-time-margin
response, but this effect is not statistically distinguishable from zero. Similarly, the wage-
induced effect on number of transcribed images is marginally asymmetric, though not
statistically significant. Interestingly, the contribution of the extensive margin response
to the observed changes in transcription is asymmetric. Over all, our results point to
an upward sloping supply curve that appears to be kinked around the reference wage of
$0.15.
We argue that our findings can be rationalized by the theoretical model put forward
by Ahrens et al. (2014); see Section 3. Workers are loss averse with reference-dependent
utility functions. This implies that workers’ labor-supply functions are kinked at $0.15,
and have steeper slopes in the gain domain than in the loss domain. In this framework, a
$0.03 wage decrease is predicted to have a larger labor-supply effect than a $0.03 wage
increase. Our findings are consistent with this prediction. Our findings are also consistent
with the empirical results of Kube et al. (2013). Importantly, our results add to these
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two papers by further illuminating the nature of the asymmetry of labor supply responses
to wage changes. In particular, we find that asymmetry is more pronounced on the
extensive margin relative to the intensive margin. This refinement of the asymmetry is
especially important since it is generally accepted that labor supply elasticities are mainly
determined by the extensive margin response (Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999; Meghir and
Phillips, 2010; Bargain et al., 2014). That we find evidence for an upward sloping labor
supply curve is also consistent with the labor supply literature (e.g., Keane, 2011; Bargain
et al., 2014).
Standard Labor Supply. To argue that our asymmetric results are due to loss aversion
requires that we rule out rational responses predicted by the standard model. For example,
one possible explanation of our extensive-margin results is that they are driven by a
rational response to the difference between reservation wages and the newly announced
wage. The argument goes as follows. A worker’s decision to work or not is determined by
the wage rate relative to the worker’s reservation wage. The worker chooses to work if
the wage rate is greater than her reservation wage. Since participation in our experiment
is voluntary, it is reasonable to assume that the reservation wage for our workers has a
distribution that is bounded between $0 and $0.15. This raises the possibility that some
workers have reservation wage between $0.12 and $0.15. If true, this would make the
observed responses consistent with a rational calculus instead of behavioral biases. In
particular, we would expect all rational workers with reservation wage between $0.12 and
$0.15 to quit the labor task when the wage rate decreases to $0.12. We argue that there
are at least two reasons to rule out this possible explanation. First, using a labor task
that is very similar to ours, Horton et al. (2011) find that workers in their experiment had
an implicit median reservation wage of only $0.14 per hour, which is substantially lower
than the implied hourly wage of $1.9011 in our wage decrease group.12 Second, we observe
a statistically significant extensive margin response in the wage-increase group, which
cannot be explained by reservation wage argument since every worker in this group would
have been paid below the reservation wage from the beginning of the experiment. This,
combined with the fact that the responsiveness of the wage-decrease group is approximately
twice that of the wage-increase group, suggests that the difference between reservation
wage and announced wage rate is a very unlikely explanation of our extensive-margin
results.
So what about the intensive margin results? Could these results be due to the
11Note that this hourly wage of $1.90 is a lower bound because our measure of the time it takes to
transcribe one picture overstates the actual time per picture; see Section 4.1.
12Horton et al. (2011) estimated the reservation wage using data generated from an mTurk task. The
task required mTurk workers to transcribe paragraph-sized chunks of text that is written in Tagalog, a
language of the Philippines. That is, as in our task, subjects are required to transcribe foreign language
text and are paid per transcribed text.
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standard model? We argue that this is also unlikely. Notice that the intensive margin
response is based on the difference between the marginal disutility of transcription and
the wage rate. Assuming the disutility of transcription is increasing in the number of
transcriptions, we would expect workers in the wage-increase group to work longer and
faster, relative to the control group. On the other hand, because the wage-decrease group
faces a lower fixed wage than the control group, we would expect workers in this group
to spend less time working and to do so at a slower rate. This is exactly what we find.
However, contrary to the symmetric response predicted by the standard model, we find
that the economic magnitude of these responses is asymmetric; e.g., the intensive-margin
treatment effect for the time spent working is in the wage-decrease group is four times
that in the wage-increase group.
We acknowledge that standard neoclassical labor supply model may yield asymmetric
labor supply responses, but only if the labor supply function has a particular shape. Even
then, asymmetry would only arise for non-marginal wage changes. Although our wage
rate changed by 20% from the reference point, the absolute change is only $0.03, which is
small, and may be viewed as a rather marginal change. We argue then, that we have a
“very small” wage change, which rules out the standard model as a possible explanation
for our results.
Reciprocity. Another possible explanation of our findings is reciprocity; workers inter-
pret the wage changes as punishment or reward, and respond accordingly. Workers who
receive a wage decrease feel punished and thus lower their labor supply in an effort to
punish the employer, while workers who receive a wage increase feel rewarded for their
effort and thus work harder to return the favor to their employer. To the extent that the
degree of induced reciprocity is asymmetric around a reference wage, this explanation
is potentially consistent with reference-dependence and loss-aversion, and therefore is a
potential driver of our findings. Although we have no way of ruling out this motivation
behind our results, we argue that this is an unlikely explanation based on our experimental
design. Recall that subjects are paid for each completed transcription and not per-unit-
of-time. This implies that workers in our experiment have little scope for punishing the
employer through shirking. Additionally, reducing the number of transcription implies that
a worker punishes herself in the form of lower pay-off, and potentially lower performance
rating, which affects her prospects of being allowed to work on other mTurk tasks.13 One
strategy to punish the employer without incurring a cost is to continue to work hard, but
submit transcriptions that are of low enough quality to be mostly useless to the employer,
13Workers on mTurk receive performance rating for each task they complete. Employers often use
workers’ performance rating to screen out low performers from their tasks. Therefore, a worker who
decides to punish us because their wage has been reduced, runs the risk of limiting the number of tasks
she will qualify to work on in the future.
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but high enough quality to avoid a negative performance review. Because we have the
transcriptions and the actual texts, we can check to see if workers used this strategy; there
is no evidence that they did (see Section 5.3).
Similarly, as opposed to settings where workers are paid per hour, transcribing more
pictures is not a reward for the employer in our experiment since this increases the costs
to the employer. Workers are also likely to know that employers can easily recruit other
workers to transcribe pictures and that employers therefore do not face the risk that
pictures remain untranscribed.
6.2 Implications
The existing labor supply literature identifies labor supply elasticities by exploiting data
comprised of both wage increases and decreases. This approach makes sense in the
context of the standard labor supply model where the elasticity is shown to be symmetric.
It also makes sense when one considers that nominal wages are almost always rising.
However, this approach becomes problematic if one believes that workers respond to
real wages rather than nominal wages, and that workers have reference-dependent utility
functions. The reason is that real wages vary more greatly over time and generally reflect
both increases and decreases. As Ahrens et al. (2014) have shown theoretically and we
have found empirically, labor supply responds asymmetrically to wage changes under
these circumstances. Our results suggest that this is especially true for the extensive
margin responses that drive labor supply elasticities. Relying on the standard estimation
approach under these circumstance leads to overestimated elasticities when wages rise
and underestimated elasticities when wages fall.
From a purely academic perspective, our findings confirm that labor supply is best
modeled with reference-dependent utility functions that allows the modeler to account
for an asymmetric response to wages. Our findings are also practically useful, since labor
supply elasticities play an important role in quantifying the economic impacts of policy
changes that affect wages; e.g., minimum wage polices. One policy area where our findings
are likely to be particularly useful is taxation. Tax reforms generally result in either tax
increases or tax decreases. In fact, upward and downward changes are more prominent for
tax rates than for wages. Further, the tax elasticity of labor supply plays a key role in
determining the efficiency cost and revenue impacts of tax policy changes. We know that
the tax elasticity of labor supply is generally larger than the wage elasticity: e.g., due to
tax aversion (Kessler and Norton, 2015). This suggests that the labor-supply asymmetry
with respect to tax-rate changes is likely to be more pronounced than what our findings
for labor supply responses to wage changes suggest. This makes the distinction between
rate increases and decreases more particularly important in the context of tax rate.
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6.3 Generalizability
The results described above are obtained using an experimental design in a large real-world
labor market. Importantly, workers did not know they participated in an experiment and
thus behaved as they would in their natural occurring environment. Due to randomization,
our experimental design also guarantees internal validity. Though our findings are based
on an actual real-world labor market, we are careful not to generalize our results to all
types of labor markets. Nonetheless, we argue that the findings are applicable to any labor
market with piece rate, flexibility and multiple outside options. One example of such
labor markets is on-line crowd-sourcing labor markets, which are becoming increasingly
common in the current technological age.14 A common feature of these labor markets is
that workers tend to work for relatively low wages and have extremely high levels of labor
supply flexibility. Because the labor supply effects are predominately on the extensive
margin, we argue that the results are also likely to be equally applicable to traditional
labor markets where workers face greater restrictions on labor hours.
7 Conclusion
We estimate the effect of wage change on labor supply using data generated in a field
experiment. We find strong evidence of an asymmetric response on the extensive margin.
The magnitude of the intensive-time margin responses is also indicative of an asymmetric
response, but we cannot rule out symmetry in a statistical sense. Though we cannot rule
out a symmetric response in the number of transcribe images, the evidence does suggest
that the contribution of the extensive margin to the effect of wages on transcriptions is
asymmetric. Overall, our findings suggest that the labor supply curve for workers on
mTurk is upward sloping, and is best modeled by a reference-dependent utility function
that accommodates loss aversion. In our particular setting, we find that the supply curve
is upward sloping with a kink at a wage rate of $0.15. We speculate that a similar, but
much larger asymmetric response exist for the tax elasticity of labor supply.
14See https://sites.google.com/site/johnjosephhorton/miscellany/online-labor-markets
for a list of crowd-sourcing online labor markets.
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8 Tables and Figures
8.1 Figures
Figure 1: Image of Text to be Transcribed
Notes: The Figure depicts a screenshot of an image of text that was to be transcribed by the subjects. Subjects were
randomly shown one of 128 images. All images are comparable to the image depicted in the Figure. All images are in
German and taken from a recent policy-report publication.
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Figure 2: Human Intelligence Task Shown on mTurk
Notes: The Figure depicts a screenshot from the Amazon Turk website. It shows how the labor task used for the field
experiment was advertised on Amazon Turk. Subjects are taken to our external website once they click the ”Accept Hit”
button.
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Figure 3: Instructions Shown on Our Website
Notes: The Figure depicts a screenshot of the external website that we set up for the purpose of the field experiment.
Subjects were taken to this website once they decided on the Amazon Turk website that they would like to work on the
task. The depicted screenshots provides subjects all information relevant for the task.
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Figure 4: Treatment Variation
Notes: The Figure depicts a screenshot of the treatment notification in the ”wage decrease” group. The treatment
notifications for the ”control” and ”wage increase” groups were identical except for the information regarding the piece-
rate wage for the subsequent images. The treatment notification popped up after a subject transcribed six images.
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Figure 5: Prediction: Labor Supply under Loss Aversion
Notes: The Figure displays the relationship between leisure and wages under loss aversion. The curve is kinked at the
reference wage R. Individuals who currently face the reference wage respond stronger to a wage decrease (by supplying
less labor/more leisure) than to a wage increase of equal magnitude (by supplying more labor/less leisure).
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Figure 6: Extensive Margin by Treatment Group
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Notes: The Figure depicts the share of subjects in each group who quit the labor task immediately after seeing the treatment
notification (i.e., share of subjects who transcribed six pictures but not a seventh one). The number of observations is 720
with 248 subjects in the control group, 215 subjects in the ”wage increase” group and 257 subjects in the ”wage decrease”
group. All 720 subjects in the sample have transcribed at least six images.
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Figure 7: Total Time Worked by Treatment Group
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Notes: The Figure depicts for each group the average time (in minutes) that subjects totally spent on working on the labor
task. The number of observations is 720 with 248 subjects in the control group, 215 subjects in the ”wage increase” group
and 257 subjects in the ”wage decrease” group. All 720 subjects in the sample have transcribed at least six images.
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Figure 8: Total Time Worked by Treatment Group: Intensive margin
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Notes: The Figure depicts for each group the average time (in minutes) that subjects totally spent on working on the
labor task. The underlying sample is restricted to subjects who did not quit the labor task immediately after seeing the
treatment notification (i.e., restricted to subjects who have transcribed at least seven images). The number of observations
is 591 with 213 subjects in the control group, 203 subjects in the ”wage increase” group and 175 subjects in the ”wage
decrease” group. All 591 subjects in the sample have transcribed at least seven images.
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Figure 9: Avg. Time per Transcription by Treatment Group
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Notes: The Figure depicts for each group the average time (in minutes) that subjects spent working on one image. The
number of observations is 720 with 248 subjects in the control group, 215 subjects in the ”wage increase” group and 257
subjects in the ”wage decrease” group. All 720 subjects in the sample have transcribed at least six images.
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Figure 10: Avg. Time per Transcription by Treatment Group: Intensive margin
3.876
3.313
3.8
0
1
2
3
4
Ti
m
e 
w
or
ke
d 
pe
r p
ict
ur
e
Control Increase Decrease
Conditional on transcribing at least one picture after treatment
Time worked per picture
Notes: The Figure depicts for each group the average time (in minutes) that subjects spent working on one image. The
underlying sample is restricted to subjects who did not quit the labor task immediately after seeing the treatment notifica-
tion (i.e., restricted to subjects who have transcribed at least seven images). The number of observations is 591 with 213
subjects in the control group, 203 subjects in the ”wage increase” group and 175 subjects in the ”wage decrease” group.
All 591 subjects in the sample have transcribed at least seven images.
33
Figure 11: Number of Transcribed Pics by Treatment Group
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Notes: The Figure depicts for each group the average number of images that subjects transcribed. The number of
observations is 720 with 248 subjects in the control group, 215 subjects in the ”wage increase” group and 257 subjects in
the ”wage decrease” group. All 720 subjects in the sample have transcribed at least six images.
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Figure 12: Number of transcribed pics conditional on workers who completed at least one
pic after the treatment notification
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Notes: The Figure depicts for each group the average number of images that subjects transcribed. The underlying sample
is restricted to subjects who did not quit the labor task immediately after seeing the treatment notification (i.e., restricted
to subjects who have transcribed at least seven images). The number of observations is 591 with 213 subjects in the control
group, 203 subjects in the ”wage increase” group and 175 subjects in the ”wage decrease” group. All 591 subjects in the
sample have transcribed at least seven images.
35
Figure 13: Accuracy by Treatment Group
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Notes: The Figure depicts for each group the average transcription accuracy, i.e., the average share of characters in each
image that is transcribed correctly. The number of observations is 720 with 248 subjects in the control group, 215 subjects
in the ”wage increase” group and 257 subjects in the ”wage decrease” group. All 720 subjects in the sample have transcribed
at least six images.
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8.2 Tables
Table 1: Summary statistics: Pictures transcribed and Accuracy
variable N mean sd p10 p50 p90
Pics transcribed 1152 12.81 13.23 2.00 7.00 33.00
Total time 1152 39.79 50.25 3.17 19.64 104.35
Accuracy 1151 0.97 0.02 0.96 .97 0.98
Notes: Summary statistics for outcome variables. The sample is all subjects who started working
on the task (i.e., including those who did not necessarily get to see the treatment notification after
6 transcribed pictures). Pics transcribed is the average number of images that subjects transcribed.
Total time is the average time (in minutes) that subjects totally spent on working on the labor task.
Accuracy the average share of characters that is transcribed correctly. N is the number of observations.
sd is the standard deviation. pX indicates the X-th percentile.
Table 2: Number of Observations
Seen Treatment
Group No Yes Total
Control 143 248 391
Increase 149 215 364
Decrease 140 257 397
Total 432 720 1152
Notes: Number of observations by treatment group who (i) started working on the task but did not
see the treatment notification, i.e., they transcribed five images or less (Column No) and (ii) who
transcribed at least six pictures and therefore saw the treatment notification (Column Yes).
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Table 3: Regression estimates and implied elasticities
Dependent Variable
I II III IV V
Ext. margin Pics Total Time Mean Time Accuracy
Reference group: Control
Increase -0.085*** 3.309** 6.078 -0.344 -0.000
(0.027) (1.298) (4.985) (0.264) (0.001)
Decrease 0.178*** -3.795*** -10.556** 0.175 0.000
(0.037) (1.166) (4.832) (0.358) (0.001)
constant 0.141*** 19.040*** 60.916*** 3.778*** 0.971***
(0.022) (0.870) (3.399) (0.210) (0.001)
N 720 720 720 720 719
R2 0.082 0.044 0.016 0.003 0.001
p(Inc = −Dec) 0.094 0.820 0.596 0.752 0.906
elast increase -3.02 0.87 0.50 -0.45 0
elast decrease -6.30 0.99 0.87 -0.23 0
Notes: OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant
at 1%. The explanatory variables of interest are dummies indicating the Increase and Decrease group, respectively.
The coefficients are relative to the omitted Control group. The outcome variables in columns (I) to (V ) are: (I) Ext.
margin is the extensive margin measured as a dummy variable indicating whether a subject quit the task immediately
after seeing the treatment notification. (II) Pics is the number of images transcribed. (III) Total time is the time (in
minutes) that a subject totally spent on working on the labor task. (IV ) Mean Time is the time (in minutes) that a
subject spent working on one image. (V ) Accuracy is the share of characters that is transcribed correctly. N is the
number of observations. R2 is R-squared. p(Inc = −Dec) is the p-value from a t-test testing whether the coefficients
from the coefficients for the Increase and Decrease group add up to zero. elast increase and elast decrease are the
elasticities in the treatment group that indicate how the respective outcome variable responds to the wage change,
using the control group as the counterfactual (see section 4.3).
38
Appendix
A Distribution of pictures for all workers
Figure 14: Histogramm of transcribed pictures
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Notes: Histogramm of pictures described for all workers who worked on the task. The number of observations is 1152.
Subjects saw the treatment notification after transcribing 6 pictures (indicated by the vertical line).
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B Robustness: Effect of forum post
Figure 15: Extensive Margin. Before vs after forum post
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Share Quitting After Intervention by Treatment Group
Notes: The Figure depicts the share of subjects in each group who quit the labor task immediately after seeing the treatment
notification (i.e., share of subjects who transcribed six pictures but not a seventh one). Before and After indicate whether
the observation was sampled before or after the task was discussed online (see section4.2.) The number of observations
sampled before the forum post is 318 with 102 subjects in the control group, 99 subjects in the ”wage increase” group
and 117 subjects in the ”wage decrease” group. The number of observations sampled after the forum post is 402 with 146
subjects in the control group, 116 subjects in the ”wage increase” group and 140 subjects in the ”wage decrease” group.
All subjects in the sample have transcribed at least six images.
40
Figure 16: Number of Transcribed Pics. Before vs after forum post
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Notes: The Figure depicts for each group the average number of images that subjects transcribed. Before and After
indicate whether the observation was sampled before or after the task was discussed online (see section4.2.) The number of
observations sampled before the forum post is 318 with 102 subjects in the control group, 99 subjects in the ”wage increase”
group and 117 subjects in the ”wage decrease” group. The number of observations sampled after the forum post is 402
with 146 subjects in the control group, 116 subjects in the ”wage increase” group and 140 subjects in the ”wage decrease”
group. All subjects in the sample have transcribed at least six images.
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Figure 17: Total Time Worked. Before vs after forum post
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Notes:The Figure depicts for each group the average time (in minutes) that subjects totally spent on working on the labor
task. Before and After indicate whether the observation was sampled before or after the task was discussed online (see
section4.2.) The number of observations sampled before the forum post is 318 with 102 subjects in the control group, 99
subjects in the ”wage increase” group and 117 subjects in the ”wage decrease” group. The number of observations sampled
after the forum post is 402 with 146 subjects in the control group, 116 subjects in the ”wage increase” group and 140
subjects in the ”wage decrease” group. All subjects in the sample have transcribed at least six images.
42
Figure 18: Avg. Time per Hit. Before vs after forum post
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Notes: The Figure depicts for each group the average time (in minutes) that subjects spent working on one image. Before
and After indicate whether the observation was sampled before or after the task was discussed online (see section4.2.) The
number of observations sampled before the forum post is 318 with 102 subjects in the control group, 99 subjects in the
”wage increase” group and 117 subjects in the ”wage decrease” group. The number of observations sampled after the forum
post is 402 with 146 subjects in the control group, 116 subjects in the ”wage increase” group and 140 subjects in the ”wage
decrease” group. All subjects in the sample have transcribed at least six images.
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Figure 19: Accuracy. Before vs after forum post
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Notes: The Figure depicts for each group the average transcription accuracy, i.e., the average share of characters in each
image that is transcribed correctly. Before and After indicate whether the observation was sampled before or after the
task was discussed online (see section4.2.) The number of observations sampled before the forum post is 318 with 102
subjects in the control group, 99 subjects in the ”wage increase” group and 117 subjects in the ”wage decrease” group.
The number of observations sampled after the forum post is 402 with 146 subjects in the control group, 116 subjects in
the ”wage increase” group and 140 subjects in the ”wage decrease” group. All subjects in the sample have transcribed at
least six images.
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